
























In the pamphlet Indignez-vous (Cry out! – Hessel, 2010), the reason the 
author Stéphane Hessel gives for the ne-
cessity for public indignation makes us 
listen attentively: it is the “heritage of the 
Résistance” which obliges us to protest 
against contemporary grievances. The 
heritage of the Résistance – this is the 
emotion of indignation, but it is also the 
freedom of democracy, accompanied by 
social justice and the common good of 
the welfare state. And the contemporary 
grievances – these are the false promises 
of a neoliberal politics, the arbitrariness 
of the international financial markets, 
increasing state debts, the spectacles of 
populism, and the infamousness of xe-
nophobic debates and movements.
By his essay, Stéphane Hessel declares 
implicitly that the heritage of the demo-
cratic Europe is based not only on the 
horror of the Holocaust, as Dan Diner 
called for (Diner, 2001: 65) – to which, I 
think, we should also add the horrors of 
Stalinism. This heritage is not imagina-
ble without the civil actors of the fight 
for freedom, without the Résistance.
However, we are concerned here with 
a hidden tradition which does not have 
a slogan like “Auschwitz never again”. 
This hidden tradition is marked by its 
namelessness, by the absence of the right 
words. At the moment of the refounda-
tion of freedom in Europe, the resistance 
movements were substituted for the rule 










Summary  The author is analyzing the significance of the Résistance as one of the ‘hid-
den traditions’ of European history. Invoking pre-WWII debates on pan-Europeanism and 
Hannah Arendt's political theory, the author argues that the heritage of the Résistance is 
divided between the preserved idea of a united Europe and a lost ideal of the politics of 
spontaneity, councils and deep reforms of European politics and economy.
























a myth of the Résistance whose disman-
tling years later dismantled also the Ré-
sistance as such.
In what follows I will first talk about 
the problem of the namelessness of ex-
periences, then describe the heritage of 
the Résistance as a divided heritage pre-
served only in the idea of a united Eu-
rope, while the other part, the politics of 
spontaneity, councils and deep reforms 
of European politics and economy, near-
ly got completely lost. Finally, I will 
mention some of Arendt’s conclusions 
for political theory.
1. The Unnamed New
Hannah Arendt spoke of a ‘hidden 
tradition’ in modern times. The con-
scious rebellious Jewish pariah as van-
guard of his own people (Arendt, 2007; 
see also Heuer, 2007), the sudden events 
of spontaneous political action in revo-
lutions from France 1789 to Hungary 
1956, and the forms of creating power 
in local associations. This political heri-
tage is a nameless heritage, in the case of 
the United States a “Failure to remem-
ber and, with it, failure to understand” 
(Arendt, 1963: 219) (in her German 
translation Arendt wrote: “catastrophic 
deficit of capacity of judgment” [Arendt, 
1963a: 279]), which made the US forget 
its own revolutionary heritage. “When 
we were told that by freedom we under-
stood free enterprise, we did very lit-
tle to dispel this monstrous falsehood” 
(Arendt, 1963: 219). No wonder, because 
to realize this as non-truth would have 
afforded not only to know the truth of 
the revolution but also to be able to live 
it. Obviously, together with this memory 
also the capacity got lost to understand 
freedom not only as the freedom of mar-
ket economy but as political freedom. 
“For if it is true”, wrote Arendt, “that all 
thought begins with remembrance, it is 
also true that no remembrance remains 
secure unless it is condensed and dis-
tilled into a framework of conceptual 
notions within which it can further exer-
cise itself. Experiences and even the sto-
ries which grow out of what men do and 
endure, of happenings and events, sink 
back into the futility inherent in the liv-
ing word and the living deed unless they 
are talked about over and over again” 
(ibid.: 222).
To this forgotten heritage belongs 
the forgotten experience of the revolu-
tionary societies at the beginning of the 
French Revolution which were annihi-
lated by the leaders of the Revolution, 
as well as the republican heritage of the 
councils during the Russian Revolution 
and in Hungary.
When the French poet and Résis-
tance fighter René Char wrote: “Our heri-
tage is not preceded by any testament”, 
this does not only mean, as Arendt 
wrote, the challenge of the break of tra-
dition for our capacities to understand, 
to judge and to act, and the challenge to 
find new words and concepts for a com-
pletely different world with totalitari-
anism, Holocaust and war of extermi-
nation. It was rather about the fact that 
the revolutionary experiences were for-
gotten which could have been helpful 
for the resistance fighters. Thus, the la-
ment about the missing testament be-
comes a lament about the forgetting of 
a tradition which only occasionally but 
time and again lights up: the tradition of 
spontaneous self-organisation.
Thus, the recovery of the hidden tra-
dition becomes a recovery of forgotten 
experiences which themselves consisted 
in understanding something new. The 
important problem of naming some-

























Brice Parain, philosopher and friend of 
Albert Camus, and the Hungarian writ-
er Sándor Márai. Both knew not only the 
problems to find the right words for the 
new but also the incapacitation of previ-
ous concepts based on other experiences 
or concepts based on lies and hypocrisy.
Parain begins his Studies about 
Function and Nature of Language with 
speechlessness when facing a new world: 
like “the farmer returning to his village” 
and not being familiar anymore with 
human noises, “we made the acquaint-
ance of this surprise when we returned 
from war. A long experience of distrust 
in talks and books had finally repelled us 
to our own elementary impulses. Only in 
the moments without images and words 
when we were nothing else than a sheer 
joy – as if just being born – or a natu-
ral sorrow – as if just about to die – we 
were sure not to dream” (Parain, 1969: 
9f). But we cannot live without words: 
“Whenever we are in misery it is the lan-
guage which brings us the right solution. 
There is no other one. ... The absurd is 
named. The despair is being sung. All 
wears off in words and revives in them” 
(ibid.: 16f).
Only by defining the new we can find 
our place. Sándor Márai’s novel Libera-
tion about the liberation of Budapest by 
the Red Army is told by a woman hiding 
in a basement, where a Russian soldier 
enters. She offers him her confidence 
and is raped by him. Like Parain, Márai 
describes the distrust in words and expe-
riences, the fact “that there is something 
which is more than party and politics, 
and this is the authentic, most extreme 
action: countenance” (Márai, 2010: 36). 
“Words are not reliable and therefore su-
perfluous” (ibid.: 39), reliable is only the 
glance examining the face of the other. 
But only when the woman can tell what 
happens to the Red Army soldier after 
the mute rape, when she can think “he is 
ashamed about something, therefore he 
is hiding his face ... He is ashamed of be-
ing a man ... Now when formulating this, 
the trembling in her body ends” (ibid.: 
181). With her capacity to understand 
by articulating in her own words what 
happens, the woman can understand re-
ality and recovers her inner balance. 
But words can be full of ambigui-
ties, false images and lies. In a review 
of Parain’s writings, Camus pointed out 
that sometimes we are lacking the right 
words, and sometimes words are deceiv-
ing us, even when our heart is talking 
with utmost honesty, e.g. when sayings 
like “to fulfil someone’s duty for society” 
or “to die on the field of honour” are to 
hide experiences which make us despair 
(Camus, 1981: 1672f).
To say what is (Herodotus), to tell 
the truth, and to narrate – those ac-
tivities for Arendt are not only the key 
to find sense and to understand, but at 
the same time are inseparably bound to 
naming. For it is not sufficient to tell sto-
ries as such even if they are the basis for 
all future memory. The new must also 
be called the new, otherwise totalitari-
anism remains misunderstood as one 
of the brutal forms of domination of the 
past and the Résistance as a series of ac-
tions of armed resistance. The norma-
tive power of the de facto, the rule of the 
victorious, leads straight to oblivion, es-
pecially when the defeated remains un-
named. How little the rebellions in the 
GULags of Nowoscherkassk, Kengir, 
Sachalin and Workuta were of interest 
to the West though described by Solzhe-
nitsyn, how little effect had the decla-
ration of the Polish historian and poli-
tician Bronislaw Geremek in 2000, that 
























est bad conscience for having left Poland 
in the sphere of influence of the Soviet 
Union! (Spinelli, 2002: 15f).
In the same way, the essence of the 
Résistance as a spontaneous form of 
self-organisation of the people was not 
framed in words, but left to oblivion in 
the light of the power of the de facto, the 
victory of the allied forces, and the sub-
sequent elections of old parties into new 
parliaments. In the after-war Europe, di-
vided into spheres of domination of li-
beralism and communism, there was no 
place for a new republican form of self-
-organisation of the peoples.
2. The Divided Heritage: Europe Yes, 
Councils No
The Résistance is marked by two as-
pects of its activities: the clear goal of a 
united Europe, and the less clear goals of 
new forms of political and social organi-
zation of the European societies. The lat-
ter dealt with creating horizontal pow-
er and federation in a republican sense 
inhibited after the war by power politics 
of traditionally organized parties. They 
assumed slowly the idea of Europe, but 
rejected the model of power of the Ré-
sistance.
First the idea of Europe: This idea was 
by no means first mentioned by Church-
ill in his famous speech in Zürich in Sep-
tember 1946 or invented by one of the 
founders of Europe – Robert Schumann, 
Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer 
or Alcide de Gasperi. It was rather en-
dorsed since the twenties by persons like 
Coudenhove-Kalergi in his plea for Pan-
-Europe, a bestseller in 1923 (Couden-
hove-Kalergi, 1923) and by the German 
Social-democratic Party in its program 
of Heidelberg in 1925. Coudenhove-Ka-
lergi declared that between the “Scylla 
of the Russian military dictatorship and 
the Charybdis of the American financial 
dictatorship”, only a small path lead to 
the future: “This path is called Pan-Eu-
rope and means: self-help by uniting Eu-
rope to constitute a political-economical 
partnership of convenience” (ibid.: XI) 
from Portugal to the borders of the Sovi-
et Union, including the African colonies, 
but excluding Great Britain because of 
its worldwide empire. This union would 
also be a community of values.
The German Social-democratic Par-
ty propagated the idea of “creating a Eu-
ropean Union of Economy compellingly 
necessary for economic reasons, of con-
stituting the United States of Europe to 
reach a solidarity of interests of the peo-
ples of all continents” (Osterroth / Schus-
ter, 1980). In 1929 the French minister of 
foreign affairs Aristide Briand hopefully 
proposed at the League of Nations to es-
tablish a Pan-Europe, an initiative which 
became obsolete with Hitler’s seizure of 
power in 1933.
But the idea of Europe did not only 
exist as the idea of an economic and cul-
tural union, but also as a völkisch pan-
-Europeanism discussed by Arendt in 
her The Origins of Totalitarianism as an 
attempt to create a völkisch, and not a 
democratic Europe.
Hitler and WWII demonstrated the 
failure of the League of Nations, but the 
national resistance movements formu-
lated the goal of a united Europe. As dis-
tinguished from Coudenhove-Kalergi 
and the Social Democrats, their main 
interest was not the economic union but 
a political, federal and republic unifica-
tion to prevent the restoration of con-
flictive nation states and of a disastrous 
pan-Europeanism.
In this sense, the group “Federalist 

























ero Spinelli in Milano in 1943 declared 
that “the defence of peace and freedom 
on the whole continent could only be 
secured by a European federation and 
its institutions” (cited in Lipgens, 1968: 
157).
In Germany above all the “Kreisau 
Circle” declared in its manifesto “Prin-
ciples, goals and tasks”, written by Hell-
muth James von Moltke in 1941, that 
the end of power politics, nationalism, 
race thinking and rule of the state vio-
lence over the individual had come and 
offered “the opportunity of a beneficial 
reorganisation of the world ... not expe-
rienced by humankind since the collapse 
of the medieval church” (ibid.: 114). The 
essence of the reform should be a clear 
rejection of any traditional thinking in 
categories of sovereignty and nation 
states. “Europe is a federal state with a 
common sovereignty” (ibid.: 116). Any-
how, Moltke could only imagine a Eu-
rope under German leadership (ibid.: 
125), as well as Carl Goerdeler, member 
of the national conservative resistance, 
who only argued for a loose European 
union (Goerdeler / Beck, 1965: 98).
Polish resistance delegates of three of 
the four most important organisations 
formulated political statements saying: 
“The Polish republic will be member of 
the federation of free European peoples” 
and try to “support in it the highest pos-
sible cohesion being powerful enough 
to protect the federated peoples against 
attacks from outside and to oppress all 
attempts to create disunion by national-
ism” (Lipgens, 1968: 157).
In France, Léon Blum, factual lead-
er of the Socialist Party and three times 
prime minister, presented with his go-
vernment program in 1947 his politi-
cal testament – the vision of Europe as 
an “international third force” beside the 
United States and the Soviet Union. He 
declared “that considering the contem-
porary economic development, none 
of the big problems can any longer be 
solved satisfyingly within the borders, 
that without a vivid solidarity with the 
others no people can live anymore in 
wealth or survive, and that we have to 
form groups, federate and unite or we 
will perish”.
Also, resistance groups in France 
and Italy wanted a federated Europe in-
cluding Germany: “Libérer et Féderer” 
with Albert Camus, whose “Third Let-
ter to a German Friend” opposed a com-
mon, pluralistic and civilised Europe to 
the Pan-Europe of Nazi-Germany; the 
group “Combat” with Henri Frenay, and 
in Italy, among others, the group “Partito 
d’Azione” (Party of Action) with the fu-
ture senator Norberto Bobbio, Arendt’s 
friend Nicola Chiaromonte, Primo Levi 
and the later president of Italy Carlo 
Ciampi.
Beside the orientation of a unit-
ed Europe, all non-communist resist-
ance groups were especially interested 
in a democratisation of their countries. 
The Italian “Federal Movement of Eu-
rope” favoured a constituency to create 
the United States of Europe on the basis 
of a republican constitution of all their 
federated states. “The unity from above 
cannot be favoured by federalism”, the 
movement declared in 1944. “What is 
important is the unity from below, that 
means a structured unity respecting the 
specific plurality of the centres of politi-
cal life and developing detailed exigen-
cies for the unity formulated by them...” 
(Lipgens, ed., 1968: 98).
The “Kreisau Circle” developed ide-
as of a federal and decentralized union 
of states with a strong commonweal ori-
























and national economies in strong fede-
ralized countries. With regard to the ci-
tizenship, “commonweal-oriented func-
tions” should get “political privileges” 
(Moltke, in Lipgens, 1968).
In his critique of the old France, Léon 
Blum endorsed a thorough reform, the 
implementation of a strong democracy 
abandoning state centralism, adding to 
the political institutions “the gravitation 
of small satellites” (ibid.: 187), the de-
mocratization of the economy, and the 
integration of France into an effective 
international union of states.
For the Résistance, the place of Ger-
many in the future was without any 
doubt within the international commu-
nity.
Henri Frenay asked in 1941: “What 
do the French know about the new or-
der they are wanting? They know that 
the Third Republic is dead, but that they 
cling to the republican form, they know 
that liberalism is dead, but that individual 
freedom is very important for them, that 
capitalism is dead, but that they do not 
want to substitute it for a state-monopo-
listic, but for a differentiated organisation 
of production” (Frenay, 1968: 195).
And he answered these questions 
in 1943: “Some of the governments far 
away in their exile do not hear the thun-
der of the wave rising in their peoples. 
They should take care. The peoples pro-
gressed in their misery and with it in 
the last three years faster than they had 
before in half a century. It is now up to 
the governments to adjust themselves, 
otherwise they will have to realise after 
their return that an abyss has emerged 
between them and the nation which can 
hardly be bridged” (Frenay, 1968a: 229).
“Libérer et Féderer”, one of the 
strongest resistance groups, attracted 
revolutionary Marxists, syndicalists of 
the Proudhon orientation, and Chris-
tian socialists (see Clair, 1944: 229), and 
fought in its manifesto and program of 
action in 1944 for an economic and po-
litical turnover of the French central state 
in favour of decentralisation and social 
justice. In its program the group propa-
gated the nationalisation of the basic ma-
terials industry, the transfer of big com-
panies into the hands of “councils elected 
by the assembly of workers and techni-
cians”, and “the organization of a new po-
litical framework through the election of 
councils of the different enterprises, in-
stitutions, establishments expressing the 
various other activities and collective 
functions ... Federation of these councils 
on the communal, departmental, region-
al and national levels in connection with 
a representation of the people established 
on the basis of universal suffrage and the 
civil equality of both sexes”, and “the in-
tegration of France into the United States 
of Europe” (ibid.).
For Camus, the democracy of pre-
-war times was only a caricature of it-
self; now the task was to develop popu-
lar politics which does not yet require 
the suffering and indignities of the peo-
ple for allegedly higher goals (Camus, 
1991: 47f).
Arendt was enthusiastic about this 
movement. In her essay “Approaches to 
the ‘German Guilt’” she called them “the 
true homines novi” whose “main ene-
my is fascism, not Germany; their main 
problem is the crisis of all State orga-
nizations of the Continent, not merely 
the German or Prussian State” (Arendt, 
1994: 113f). She wrote to Jaspers in 1946: 
“There are still real men; they are of 
course an evanescent minority, but they 
are there and they are, what is decisive, 
still ready to fight and risk their lives” 

























is now in all European countries sud-
denly a new type of man who is simply 
and without any ‘European nationalism’ 
European. I knew such an Italian. Ca-
mus belongs to them. They are already 
at home everywhere. Sartre in contrast 
is still too much a typical Frenchman ... 
For me this is quite new, before the war 
I did not see nearly any of those people. 
It is as if the common experience of fas-
cism, when you really made it, let several 
people accomplish in an instant what in 
former times only was an idealistic pro-
gram without any reality” (ibid.: 103).
In autumn 1945, in her essay “Par-
ties, Movements, and Classes”, Arendt 
emphasised that with the Popular Front 
and the Résistance two movements had 
emerged which had nothing to do with 
the disastrous communist and fascist 
movements. “The Résistance ... took 
over not only the principle of proclaim-
ing the people (and not solely classes) 
the subject of politics, but it inherited 
the new political enthusiasm which was 
expressed in the revival of such funda-
mental concepts of political life as jus-
tice, liberty, human dignity and basic 
responsibilities of the citizen” (Arendt, 
1945: 511). Thereby, as Arendt wrote, 
and in their goal of a federated Europe 
and their interest in each other to cre-
ate a “unity without uniformity”, they 
distinguished themselves from the tra-
ditional parties marked by class diffe-
rences and economic interests.
When in 1952 Arendt met Henri Fre-
nay in Paris, she wrote in a letter to her 
husband Heinrich Blücher: “The only 
one who could have seized power after 
the Libération – and did not do it be-
cause of decency and stupidity, but who 
is not at all stupid but concise and intelli-
gent, understands America (that is real-
ly incredible), he is a modern man and 
should in fact really make politics instead 
of being annoyed in this lost dump of 
Federal Europe. I liked him very much ...” 
(Arendt / Blücher, 1996: 256).
3. The End of the Résistance
What Arendt discovered in the Résist-
ance of those years was an experience of 
the joy to act, to be actor and challenger, 
to be “visited ... by an apparition of free-
dom”, and thus to find oneself (Arendt, 
2006: 4). We find this apparition of free-
dom in many movements, observed by 
Alexis de Tocqueville also in the French 
Revolution: “What has made so many 
men, since untold ages, stake their all on 
liberty is its intrinsic glamour, a fascina-
tion it has in itself, apart form all ‘prac-
tical’ considerations. For only in coun-
tries where it reigns can a man speak, 
live, and breathe freely, owing obedience 
to no authority save God and the laws 
of the land. The man who asks of free-
dom anything other than itself is born to 
be a slave” (Tocqueville, 1955, ch. III, 3: 
168f). René Char phrased this in his po-
etical resistance-diary Leaves of Hypnos 
(Les Feuillets d’Hypnos, No. 188: “Entre 
le monde de la réalité et moi, il n’y a plus 
aujourd’hui d’épaisseur triste”), and the 
Italian writer Luigi Meneghello, activ-
ist of “Partito d’Azione”, in his autobio-
graphical novel The Little Masters about 
a resistance group of students in north-
ern Italy. But Meneghello described also 
the fundamental problem of theoretical 
ignorance of the Resistanza: “It would 
have been very simple to start a revo-
lution. Of course, we would have been 
annihilated soon, at least the first push, 
and then the second, and the third. But 
Italy would have had at least a taste of 
what it means to renovate oneself from 
scratch ... It would have been enough 
























them” (Meneghello, 1990: 46), the texts 
of revolution. And, he wrote, they did 
not find answers to the questions posed 
by the war: what was Italy, society, con-
science, and virtues.
In 1944, the non-dogmatic socialist 
and American sociologist Lewis Coser 
wrote optimistically in the journal Poli-
tics about the strength of the Résistance 
– two years later, he already searched for 
the reasons of its defeat. The movement, 
he explained, was only held together by 
the existence of the enemy, it was social-
ly diffuse, its solidarity against the ene-
my did not survive the end of the war, 
and it suffered from the absence of po-
litical theory. In explicit contradiction to 
Arendt, he declared that internationalism 
was not sufficiently internalized by the 
movement, so the Résistance was in its 
essence not more than a national move-
ment (Clair, 1946: 117). But, also, Arendt 
already realized in her above-mentioned 
essay that the Résistance lost its political 
potential with the increasing econom-
ic interests of its members immediately 
after the war; the same had happened to 
the Popular Front in France, she wrote, 
losing the fight against Fascism since 
the moment when the workers no long-
er fought for the defence of the Spanish 
Republic, but were only focused on their 
own economic interests in France.
The fact that the Résistance did not 
find the power to transform itself into 
a political movement created a vacu-
um which the traditional parties occu-
pied immediately. On the one hand, De 
Gaulle, for Arendt representing the for-
ces “of the day before yesterday” of “patri-
otism and nationalism in the old sense” 
(Arendt, 1994: 118), adapted himself in 
a clever way to the demands of the un-
derground for democracy, and focused 
together with the Allied Forces on ra-
pid elections for a tired population. On 
the other hand, the French Communist 
Party already agitated during the time of 
resistance against the supposedly “super 
state” of Europe and requested the Ré-
sistance to advocate above all the “in-
dependence of France and the restitu-
tion of its Grandeur” (Zentralkomitee..., 
1968: 240). Arendt wrote: “The resist-
ance movement waited for the liberation 
but believed that it would be liberated in 
order to choose free and establish a new 
order of things. This did not come true. 
Chief factor: Communism. The terri-
ble massacre in France” (Estate, Library 
of Congress, Washington, p. 023769), 
meaning the summary execution of col-
laborators. “The greatest contribution” 
of the Résistance, declared the historian 
James D. Wilkinson, “remained a moral 
one: the defeat of nihilism and the crea-
tion of an ethical consensus based on the 
principle of human dignity. Its most se-
rious failure was the inability to imple-
ment its values in the political or social 
sphere” (Wilkinson, 1981: 263; see also 
Sumner, 1996: 81). A 1944 report in Po-
litics, a journal of a group of American 
radicals around Arendt, about a suppos-
edly coming “dual power” in France of 
the Résistance and de Gaulle (Macdo-
nald, 1944: 290-294), turned out to be 
wishful thinking. Finally, the liberation 
movements were squashed everywhere 
in Europe by realpolitik – Stalin in Po-
land, Churchill in Greece, and the res-
toration of Europe in terms of nation 
states with collective security, clearly de-
marcated spheres of interest and bilater-
al alliance (see Arendt, 1994: 118).
But the real problem consisted in the 
fact that there was no theoretical con-
sideration of these experiences. Coser 
observed hopelessly: “They never had 

























of our times is precisely to understand 
these times – so as to be able to change 
them” (Clair, 1946: 117). And Arendt de-
clared in 1961 in her preface to her book 
Between Past and Future: “The trage-
dy began not when the liberation of the 
country as a whole ruined, almost au-
tomatically, the small hidden islands of 
freedom that were doomed anyhow, but 
when it turned out that there was no 
mind to inherit and to question, to think 
about and to remember. ... without this 
thinking completion after the act, with-
out the articulation accomplished by re-
membrance, there simply was no story 
left that could be told” (Arendt, 2006: 6).
This made it even easier for those 
French intellectuals, professionally cre-
ating opinions and telling stories, to col-
laborate in a Gaullist and communist 
formation of legends (Benfredj, 2003). 
These legends comprehend at the same 
time the betrayal of incorruptible free-
dom and justice. Camus complained in 
his speech “Bread and Freedom” in 1953 
about the division of the intellectuals to 
partisans for the West and partisans for 
the East. The confusion of the language 
expresses this betrayal, he said; the ab-
sence of freedom and justice in one’s 
own camp is rectified by denouncing the 
same fact in the other camp. The dicta-
torship of Franco is defended by point-
ing to the dictatorship in Poland, and 
vice versa (Camus, 1960: 51). Camus 
criticised that freedom is thereby dis-
credited as bourgeois freedom, and jus-
tice without freedom or freedom with-
out justice is defined as real justice or 
real freedom. “For all of us there can be 
only one slogan”, Camus declared, “not 
to cede in anything that refers to justice 
and not to resign in anything that refers 
to freedom. ... There is no ideal freedom 
which would be presented us some day 
at a single blow like receiving pension at 
the end of one’s life. The freedoms must 
be conquered, one after the other ... We 
choose freedoms today only on the level 
of those who are suffering and fighting 
everywhere, there and only there. We 
choose them at the same time togeth-
er with justice and, in fact, in the future 
it will no longer be possible to choose 
one of them without the other” (ibid.). 
This intransigent critique was the herit-
age of the Résistance Camus wanted to 
preserve, adding to this his plea against 
all killing, especially against the hunting 
down and summary execution of colla-
borators, and his rejection of any politics 
of revolutionary violence (“Neither Vic-
tims nor Executioners”).
The long-lasting isolation of Camus 
in the intellectual public of France is the 
consequence of the victory of the lie and 
the failure of the intellectuals, of an im-
partial judgment; it meant the domina-
tion of phantasms.
4. The Unknown Social Contract
Arendt’s book On Revolution repre-
sents her “effort to recapture the lost 
spirit of revolution” (ibid.: 226). She de-
fined the spontaneous self-organisation 
of councils and revolutionary organisa-
tions as forms of generating power and 
politics of its own, as a new form of state. 
So she puts the Résistance into a context 
with a political phenomenon whose the-
oretical concept is still missing.
According to Arendt, the historical 
experience reveals the contradiction be-
tween parliament and people, between 
delegation of power at election day and 
permanent generation of power, between 
the rule of parties as representatives and 
councils as places of public debate and 
judgment. Councils override the right-
























public opinion, they consist in division 
of power, decentralisation and federal-
ism, they represent the republic and not 
the nation state, and finally, according to 
Arendt, they are the only places of free-
dom. “Wherever knowing and doing 
have parted company, the space of free-
dom is lost” (ibid.: 268).
This way of thinking about politics 
implies rejection of the social contracts 
of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and 
that is exactly what Arendt implicitly 
does in her unpublished lecture “From 
Machiavelli to Marx” (Arendt, 1965). In 
distinction to Camus and his “new social 
contract”, she is not dealing with an ethi-
cal social contract, which Camus advo-
cated in his essay “Neither Victims nor 
Executioner”,1 but with the political so-
1 “Let us suppose that certain individuals re-
solve that they will consistently oppose to 
power the force of example; to authority, ex-
hortation; to insult, friendly reasoning; to 
trickery, simple honour. Let us suppose they 
refuse all the advantages of present-day soci-
ety and accept only the duties and obligations 
which bind them to other men. Let us sup-
cial contract of a citizen’s republic based 
on the existence of political spaces of 
practical freedom.
In a Europe in which different forms 
of federalism, participation and civil so-
ciety have been emerging for decades, 
we should use the opportunity to recap-
ture the thread of a hidden, oppressed 
and forgotten history, to think about 
it in theoretical terms, and to confront 
it with liberal democracy and the mo-
nopolistic supremacy of parties, parlia-
ments and bureaucracies. The heritage 
of the Résistance does not only consist 
in the defence of our freedom against 
populism and neo-liberalism, but first 
of all in the task to give this tradition 
voice and face.
pose they devote themselves to orienting 
education, the press and public opinion to-
ward the principles outlined here. Then I say 
that such men would be acting not as Uto-
pians but as honest realists. They would be 
preparing the future and at the same time 
knocking down a few of the walls which im-
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Neimenovano nasljeđe Résistance
SAŽETAK  Autor analizira važnost pokreta Résistance kao jedne od ‘skrivenih tradicija’ eu-
ropske povijesti. Pozivajući se na rasprave o pan-europeizmu prije Prvog svjetskoga rata i 
političku teoriju Hanne Arendt, autor brani tezu da je nasljeđe pokreta Résistance podije-
ljeno između preživjele ideje ujedinjene Europe i izgubljenog ideala politike spontanosti, 
vijećanja i dubokih reformi europske politike i gospodarstva.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI  pokret Résistance, skrivene tradicije, Arendt, pan-europeizam
